Constructions of Goethe Versus Constructions of Kant in German Intellectual Culture, 1900-1925 by Michael Saman
Michael Saman
Goethe Yearbook, Volume 21, 2014, pp. 157-189 (Article)
Published by North American Goethe Society
DOI: 10.1353/gyr.2014.0038
For additional information about this article
                                                     Access provided by Princeton University (3 Jun 2014 15:24 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/gyr/summary/v021/21.saman.html
Goethe Yearbook XXI (2014)
MICHAEL SAMAN
Constructions of Goethe versus 
Constructions of Kant in German 
Intellectual Culture, 1900–1925
Reconfiguring Goethe
IN THE EARLY DECADES of the twentieth century, Goethe scholarship found itself in a charged and complex state of affairs.1 The defining philologi-
cal undertaking of Wilhelm Scherer and his generation reached its culmina-
tion in 1919 with the completion of the monumental Weimarer Ausgabe of 
Goethe’s works, yet for an emerging generation of critics, the driving convic-
tion of Scherer’s positivist school—namely that empirically founded philol-
ogy would yield the most valid and authentic insights regarding Goethe and 
his work—had gradually lost much of its power to convince. “Eine Fülle von 
Tatsachen und Material ist aufgehäuft worden,” went one critic’s response, 
“aber das Vermögen zur Synthese hat in keiner Weise damit Schritt halten 
können” (A wealth of facts and material has been amassed, but the capac-
ity for synthesis has in no way been able to keep up).2 As the ethos that 
had produced this philological landmark was declared inadequate, a vocal set 
of critics in Germany began instead to embrace the diametrically opposed, 
highly speculative and vitalistic sensibilities of Neuromantik (neo-Romanti-
cism). Rather than an emphasis on text, one witnessed the emergence of a 
post-Nietzschean interest in mythical, heroic constructions of key symbolic 
historical personalities—one may think, for example, of the George Circle’s 
lionizing of individuals such as Caesar, Frederick the Great, and, of course, 
Nietzsche himself.
Hand in hand with these changes in literary scholarship, the figure of 
Goethe underwent extraordinary transformations starting around 1900. 
Having become an irreplaceable symbolic pillar of the new German nation-
state after 1871, Goethe was now energetically refashioned into an icon for 
an ever bolder yet deeply unstable Wilhelmine Germany.  As literary criti-
cism became less empirical, as philosophy (especially under the rubric of 
Lebensphilosophie) became more irrationalist, and as political sentiment 
gained ever greater influence over intellectual culture, Goethe, as a paragon 
of post-Enlightenment thinking, emerged as a model for the new postposi-
tivist mind-sets. Literary critics became openly disdainful of thought that 
limited itself to what was merely documentable and invested themselves in 
what could or should be discerned in such foundational personalities; at the 
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same time, Goethe commentary began to be intellectualized in ways that 
decidedly overstepped the strictures of literary scholarship: “Die wissen-
schaftliche Beschäftigung mit Goethe,” writes Karl Robert Mandelkow, “war 
. . . aus dem Ghetto der Philologie entlassen und wurde zum Gegenstand 
aller Wissenschaftsdisziplinen” (Mandelkow 2:23;  The scholarly treatment of 
Goethe was freed from the ghetto of philology and became subject matter 
for all scholarly disciplines).
To be sure, some updating may well have been due, for by the turn of 
the twentieth century, the figure of Goethe had come to look precisely the 
way the late nineteenth century had chosen to construe him: as an imposing 
figure from the past. In 1899, neo-Kantian philosopher Wilhelm Windelband 
articulated this sense vividly:
Wer aus den Thoren Roms hinauspilgert in die Campagna, den Bergen zu, der 
sieht alle die Mauern und Türme, die Kuppeln und Spitzen mehr und mehr 
verschwimmen und verschwinden: und schließlich, wenn die ewige Stadt nur 
noch wie eine einzige Masse daliegt, dann wölbt sich über ihr, allbeherrschend, 
die Eine gewaltige Kuppel von St. Peter. So geht es uns mit der zeitlichen 
Entfernung von Goethe.  Je weiter wir von jener größten Zeit der deutschen 
Kulturgeschichte abkommen, in der um die Wende des vorigen und dieses 
Jahrhunderts unser Volk seine verlorene Nationalität sich geistig neu geschaf-
fen hat, um so beherrschender erhebt sich daraus für unsern Rückblick in 
unvergleichlicher Mächtigkeit die Gestalt Goethes—eine Welt für sich, die alles 
umfaßt und alles überragt.3
[Whoever makes the pilgrimage from the gates of Rome out into the Campagna 
and toward the mountains sees all the walls and towers, the domes and stee-
ples, blurring and disappearing more and more into the distance.  And final-
ly, when the Eternal City has become an indistinguishable mass, there looms 
imperiously over it the one mighty dome of St. Peter’s. So it is for us with the 
temporal distance from Goethe.  The further we move away from this greatest 
age of German cultural history, in which at the turn of the previous and this 
century our people created its lost nationhood anew in the realm of the intel-
lect, the more imperiously the figure of Goethe rises up in incomparable might 
before our retrospective gaze—a world in itself, which encompasses and tow-
ers above all else.]
Goethe, who for much of the nineteenth century had still been within living 
memory, remained an imposing presence, yet was now slipping inexorably 
into historical distance.  This transition provoked dramatic changes in the 
way he was represented. Rather than an untouchable and immutable classi-
cal figure, the need was felt for a more vitalistic icon whose spirit could still 
be felt here, now, in the present. During the ensuing years, therefore, Goethe 
would be remodeled, bit by bit, from the august, classical Olympian of the 
founding years of the Reich into the modern Germanic Übermensch of the 
1910s through the 1940s.
This transition is evident in Richard Dehmel’s 1908 “Der Olympier 
Goethe: Ein Protest.” Here, Dehmel reports a realization that had come to him 
upon rereading Goethe’s poetic work: “Ich fand einen wesentlich anderen 
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Goethe,” he writes, “als ich ihn in der Vorstellung trug, und als er wahrschein-
lich vielen Deutschen von der Schulbank her vorschweben wird”4 (I found 
a fundamentally different Goethe from the one I carried in my memory, and 
from the one many Germans probably recall from their school days).  The 
hitherto prevalent conception of Goethe, he argues, no longer seems an ade-
quate or convincing way of capturing what had made Goethe great. Quite 
the contrary,
es heißt Goethe verkleinern, wenn man ihn als Olympier anspricht. Soweit 
er wirklich olympische Anlagen hatte, war er weder ein Zeus noch ein Apoll; 
dazu mangelte ihm vor allem andern die unerschütterliche Hartherzigkeit 
dieser antiken Ideale. Nicht einmal ein Dionysos war er in seinen unbeküm-
merten Stimmungsstunden, sondern höchstens ein Ganymed oder Hermes, ein 
Spender der Anmut und Lebensklugheit, und mehr im römischen als im grie-
chischen Sinne, wie er selbst zu Herrn Eckermann sagte. (Dehmel 356, empha-
sis in the original)
[to address Goethe as an Olympian is to miniaturize him. Insofar as he indeed 
had Olympian aspects, he was neither a Zeus nor an Apollo—for this he lacked 
the unshakable hard-heartedness of these classical ideals. Not even a Dionysus 
during his more carefree moments, he was at most a Ganymede or Hermes, a 
bestower of grace and wisdom, and this more in the Roman than in the Greek 
sense, as he himself said to Eckermann.]
Goethe’s genius, according to Dehmel, lay precisely in his ability to resist fall-
ing into any classical, idealized form. “Es ist sein höchster und reinster Ruhm,” 
Dehmel writes,
daß er unablässig gegen diese Gefahr, die auch in seinem Charakter lauerte, 
seinen besten Kunstwillen aufgeboten hat, nicht wie ein ausgelernter Altmeister 
bloß, dem die mancherlei Spiegelfechtereien der poetischen Technik glatt von 
der Hand gehen, sondern als ein steter Lehrling des Lebens, in oft sehr ver-
zweifelter, manchmal vergeblicher, immer aber “strebend bemühter” und eben 
dadurch “erlösender,” für uns alle vorbildlicher Notwehr. (Dehmel 356–57)
[It is his highest and purest merit that he unrelentingly engaged his greatest 
artistic will against this danger—which also lurked in his own character—
not merely as an old hand at his trade, for whom the shadowboxing of poetic 
technique proceeds effortlessly, but rather as a permanent apprentice of life, 
in a gesture of self-defense that is exemplary for all of us—an often quite 
desperate gesture, sometimes in vain, but always “striving” and, consequently, 
“redemptive.”]
Nineteenth-century attempts to monumentalize Goethe into a classical fig-
ure appear, from the vantage point of the new century, as failures to under-
stand that it was constant striving and continual metamorphosis that had 
truly defined him, and that any hypostatizations of his person and work 
would therefore necessarily fail.  The intended scholarly rigor of institution-
alized Germanistik, on this view, systematically missed the ineffable qual-
ity that had made Goethe’s works into crucial objects of study in the first 
place.
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A handbook of literary criticism such as Rudolf Lehmann’s 1908 Deutsche 
Poetik captures the moment in which a methodological shift begins to fol-
low upon this change in sensibility.  To redress the “Einseitigkeit” (one-sided-
ness) he perceives in literary scholarship—the prevalence, namely, of the 
“genetische Untersuchung der Dichtungen” (historical-genealogical analysis 
of poetic works, i.e., philological methodology) over what he calls “künstle-
rische Erklärung” (artistic explication)—Lehmann calls for a renewed empha-
sis on speculative, subjective aesthetics.5 Rather than analyzing into con-
stituent elements that which “der Künstler als eine Einheit gesehen und als 
eine Einheit geschaffen hat” (the artist envisioned as a unity and created as a 
unity), Lehmann believes that criticism must begin to operate synthetically if 
it is to capture, in its integrity, what the author conceived.
Die ästhetische Interpretation steht dafür unmittelbar im Dienste der Kunst 
und des künstlerischen Verständnisses, und unwürdig der Wissenschaft ist ein 
solcher Dienst gewiß nicht, am wenigsten einer Wissenschaft, die mit Recht 
den Anspruch darauf erhebt, Führerin und Lehrerin der Nation zum Verständnis 
und zur Würdigung ihrer großen Dichter zu sein. (Lehmann 52)
[Aesthetic interpretation, meanwhile, stands directly in service of art and of 
an artistic mode of understanding.  And such a service is certainly not beneath 
the dignity of true scholarship—least of all of any scholarship that legitimately 
lays claim to be the guide and teacher of the nation in the understanding and 
appreciation of her great poets.]
The philological precision and factual objectivity that had characterized 
the Scherer school were now perceived as marks of intellectual frailty, of 
incapacity for philosophical speculation; subjectivity and Weltanschauung, 
rather, were key, and the ideal was to think one’s way into the innermost 
psychology and worldview of individuals—such as Goethe—who were seen 
as definitively embodying German Geist.
Mandelkow speaks of an “Akzentverlagerung von der Germanistik auf die 
Philosophie” (Mandelkow 23; shift in emphasis from Germanistik to philoso-
phy) during this time, and in the case of Goethe, the question of his relation 
to philosophy was “vorrangig auf das Verhältnis Goethes zu Kant eingeengt” 
(Mandelkow 28; constrained first and foremost to Goethe’s relationship to 
Kant)—an artificially constrained frame of reference that gave the relation-
ship between these two figures a dramatically inflated importance. In fact, it 
is largely by virtue of the “Antithese Goethe-Kant” (Goethe-Kant antithesis)6 
that Goethe took on much of his newfound vitality.  Thus, if we wish to bring 
forth his image in the early twentieth century in its sharpest contours, it 
proves necessary to direct our attention not only to the way Goethe was con-
structed in his own right but also to the way his perceived attributes were 
defined in explicit opposition to the equally iconic figure of Immanuel Kant.
Goethe versus Kant
Since Nietzsche’s famous pronouncement in Die Götzen-Dämmerung 
(The Twilight of the Idols) that Goethe and Kant personified a paradig-
matic and irreconcilable opposition within German intellectual culture, 
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any direct juxtaposition of these two figures had come to be construed 
as a zero-sum contest.7 Beginning in the 1890s and escalating through the 
years of the Weimar Republic, a remarkable discourse emerged around the 
question of “Goethe and Kant,” with partisans of both figures debating—
in increasingly agitated tones, as the years progressed—which one better 
embodied the uniqueness and greatness of German Geist: the unreflected, 
sensual, and intuitive immediacy of Goethe or the systematic, abstract, and 
analytic philosophical rigor of Kant.  According to Georg Simmel’s account 
of this polarity:
Goethe ist das größte historische Beispiel des Menschen, der nur von innen 
heraus, nach seinen eigenen Entwicklungsnotwendigkeiten lebt, von dort aus 
die Forderungen des Objekts erfüllt und zu einem reinen Bilde der Objekte 
gelangt. Kant umgekehrt steht von vornherein unter der Herrschaft objektiver 
Ideen, der Erkenntnis oder der Moral, die von sich aus sein subjektives Wesen 
zu ihnen adäquaten Formen und Inhalten gestalten.8
[Goethe is the greatest historical example of a man who lives only from the 
inside out and in accordance with the necessities of his own development, 
who from this standpoint fulfills the demands of the object and arrives at a pure 
image of objects. Kant, on the other hand, labors from the first instance under 
the domineering authority of objective ideas—cognitive or ethical ones—that, 
in and of themselves, shape his subjective essence into forms and contents that 
are adequate to them.]
Though a dichotomy between the two figures was already a commonplace, 
for thinkers of this period it became not only paradigmatic but programmatic.
In the first instance, this relation would seem to be essentially a matter 
of academic concern, yet the stakes would heighten abruptly and dramati-
cally with the outbreak of World War I. Beginning around 1914, intellectual 
discussion divorced itself ever more forcefully from standards of objectiv-
ity and merged more and more explicitly with nationalist political discours-
es.9 In a trend that reached its peak around 1916–17, many critics felt they 
had license—indeed, perhaps even a certain imperative—to construct and 
reconstruct historical icons in accordance with the exigencies of the pre-
sent. “Goethe” and “Kant” were now, in effect, no longer just historical figures 
but, rather, rival paradigms of exemplary Germanness between which the 
country would have to choose.  The fact that, during their lifetimes, Goethe 
and Kant never communicated or interacted with one another in any direct 
way (“Kant hat nie von mir Notiz genommen,” Goethe tells Eckermann in 
a conversation on April 11, 1827 [Kant never took notice of me]) was the 
very circumstance that created vast space for invention when later German 
intellectuals undertook to construct them—posthumously and counterfactu-
ally—into bitter, implacable rivals.
“Das Problem ‘Kant und Goethe,’” Ernst Cassirer would observe in the 
1920s, “gehört zu jenen Problemen der Geistesgeschichte, die schlecht-
hin unerschöpflich scheinen. So häufig, so gründlich und eingehend es 
von Philosophen und Literaturhistorikern behandelt worden ist: es fordert 
immer wieder zur Betrachtung heraus und stellt immer neue Fragen”10 (The 
162 Michael Saman
problem “Kant and Goethe” counts among those problems of intellectual 
history that seem to be sheerly inexhaustible. However often and however 
thoroughly and extensively it has been treated by philosophers and literary 
historians, it always challenges us to consider it yet again and always poses 
new questions).  The reason the topic is so contentious, Cassirer suggests, 
is because the juxtaposition of such symbolically overdetermined figures 
reaches back to something deeper, more primordial than what philological 
analysis could ever hope to capture. “Hier handelt es sich nicht mehr um ein-
zelne, literarhistorisch-aufweisbaren ‘Einflüsse,’ sondern um Zusammenstöße, 
die in die letzten Tiefen zurückweisen, denen die deutsche Geistesgeschichte 
entstammt, und aus denen sie ihre Struktur und ihre Form enthält” (Cassirer 
105; Here it is no longer a question of individual lines of “influence” that 
could be demonstrated by literary-historical scholarship but rather of col-
lisions that point us into the farthest depths from which German intellec-
tual history arises and from which it derives its structure and form). Indeed, 
the cultural symbolism of these purported Zusammenstöße (collisions) was 
high.  As a “belated” European nation, Germany felt an urgent need to coun-
terbalance its comparative lack of stable historical, territorial, institutional, 
and international political identity with its formidable body of very recent 
cultural accomplishment—and Goethe and Kant, as towering figures of that 
recent golden age, formed crucial parts of the intellectual bedrock that the 
nation saw itself as resting upon. Goethe and Kant were construed as stand-
ing in an ontologically necessary tension with one another, and any rethink-
ing of the balance of power between them meant nothing less than tamper-
ing with the quasi-mythical foundations of a nation that took the question of 
its foundations very seriously.  Any redrawing of the lines between them was 
not just a shift in facts on the surface of German intellectual culture but a 
symbolic shifting, as Josef Bleicher has written, of the “fundamental, almost 
tectonic, positions underlying the central intellectual, cultural, and political 
commitments” of the age.11
Thus laden with cultural and ideological currents quite extraneous to 
serious scholarly deliberation, and unfettered, at the same time, by a new 
fashion for rather adventurous intellectualism, the tone of discussion esca-
lated at times to almost implausible levels of fantasy and vitriol. Political, ideo-
logical, philosophical, and aesthetic transformations in Germany shaped the 
question of Goethe and Kant into a highly volatile intellectual epiphenom-
enon. In it, national political anxieties and cultural uncertainties manifested 
themselves in ways that were sometimes quite inspired, sometimes troubling, 
sometimes cartoonishly far-fetched—but, as we will see, almost never factu-
ally accurate.
Beweisbares versus Unbeweisbares
In neo-Kantian philosopher Jonas Cohn’s 1905 essay, “Das Kantische 
Element in Goethes Weltanschauung” (The Kantian Element in Goethe’s 
Weltanschauung), we find an early expression of the new speculative, 
synthetic mode of commentary applied to the question of Goethe and 
Kant. Cohn’s stated method in this essay places emphasis upon a certain 
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intellectual or spiritual added value that he believes cultural criticism must try 
to capture: beyond the simple and quantifiable “Eigenwert der Wissenschaft” 
(intrinsic scholarly value), he declares, one must aim to grasp a text’s deeper 
“Kulturbedeutung” (cultural meaning).  This element, he suggests, lies primar-
ily in the mode of subjective experience that a work models for the reader:
Was wir erleben, was von den möglichen Anschauungen in uns wirklich und 
wirksam wird, hängt überall von den Gesichtspunkten ab, unter denen unser 
Geist Erlebnisse und Dinge betrachtet. Dadurch wird uns der Sinn eines Wortes 
deutlich, das der Deutsche nicht ohne Ehrfurcht aussprechen sollte, des Wortes 
Weltanschauung.12
[What we experience, what becomes real and effective within us from among 
all possible perceptions, depends always on the perspectives from which our 
intellect observes experiences and things. In this way the meaning of a word 
becomes evident to us, a word that a German should never speak without rev-
erence: the word Weltanschauung.]
Cohn’s undertaking is expressly ahistorical in nature: he does not aim first 
and foremost to interpret actual states of affairs from Goethe’s own time; 
rather, he frames his work as a contribution toward the construction of 
normative forms of thought and pathos for contemporary use.  Above and 
beyond the intrinsic scholarly value of Goethe’s or Kant’s ideas lay the more 
visceral significance of their exemplary status for “us,” for “our” experience, 
for “our” perceptions.  The crystallization of a personal Weltanschauung, 
Cohn asserts, is “das höchste persönliche Ziel jedes denkenden Menschen” 
(the highest personal aim of every thinking person).  Thus rejecting disinter-
ested scholarly inquiry, Cohn takes the view that a Goethe critic must aim, in 
effect, both to find Goethe in himself and to find himself in Goethe.  Without 
this identification with the author, one’s work would be reduced to mere 
objectivity. “Wir verstehen dann auch,” he writes,
dass sich in der Weltanschauung wissenschaftliche und rein persönliche 
Elemente, Beweisbares und Unbeweisbares, Begriff und Gefühl unlösbar 
verbinden. Eine Weltanschauung in diesem Sinne, keine Philosophie in der 
strengen Bedeutung des Wortes hatte Goethe, ja man könnte meinen, dass das 
Wort Weltanschauung recht eigentlich auf ihn geprägt sei. (Cohn 345)
[We also understand, then, that in Weltanschauung, scholarly and purely per-
sonal elements, provable and unprovable things, concept and feeling, are inex-
tricably connected.  A Weltanschauung in this sense—not a philosophy in the 
strict sense of the word—is what Goethe had; indeed, one might even say that 
the word Weltanschauung really was coined just for him.]
To the extent, then, that Cohn sees Goethe as having exemplified this mix-
ing of the subjective and the objective, he posits that the contemporary 
Goethean thinker must do the same.  With this, Cohn more or less openly 
announces to the reader that not all of what he says will necessarily be borne 
out by proof or cogent argument. He presents this fact, however, not as a 
weakness in his work but as a strength—as an indication of his ability to 
think as Goethe did.
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Cohn’s essay centers on a fixed set of presumptions concerning Goethe’s 
response to Kant. Undergirding his views is the notion of a fundamental oil-
and-water incompatibility between the two thinkers.  This notion does not 
emerge as a conclusion from his investigations; rather, it is posited from the 
start as the operative premise that anchors his argument. Cohn thus asserts 
not only that Kant’s ethics was “fremd” (foreign) to Goethe, but that his epis-
temology was “direkt feindlich” (directly hostile; Cohn 305).  What does this 
mean concretely? Did Kant’s ideas actually intend to harm Goethe? Seeking 
to lend a deep, visceral resonance to the ostensible hostility between Goethe 
and Kant, Cohn employs a metaphor that had gained currency in recent 
years:
Während die Bereicherung seiner Erkenntnis, die Möglichkeit der Verständigung 
mit hochgeschätzten Zeitgenossen, die grössere Freiheit und Sicherheit seiner 
Anschauungen als ein Gewinn ihm vor Augen standen, fühlte [Goethe] doch, 
dass die strenge, trennende Art des Kantischen Denkens ein fremder Tropfen in 
seinem Blute war. (Cohn 290)
[While he strove for enrichment of his cognition, for the possibility of mutual 
understanding with highly regarded contemporaries, and for the greater free-
dom and surety of his perceptions, [Goethe] nevertheless felt that the strict, 
dividing manner of Kantian thought was a foreign drop in his blood.]
This gratuitous biological metaphor reads rather awkwardly for today’s 
reader, but it seems to have become a commonplace in the literature of 
the time, recurring in the works of several critics. In his 1899 lecture, “Aus 
Goethes Philosophie” (From Goethe’s Philosophy), Wilhelm Windelband 
writes:
Für [Schiller] war Kants Philosophie das Stahlbad, in das er aus verworrener 
Jugend niedertauchte, um sich in männlicher Klarheit daraus zu erheben.  Vorher 
ein stürmisches Talent, ist er nachher der große Dichter. Für Goethe dagegen ist 
jene Reflexion ein fremder Tropfen in seinem Blute. (Windelband 91)
[For [Schiller], Kant’s philosophy was the bracing mineral bath into which he 
dove out of a confused youth, to rise from it in masculine clarity. Previously a 
tempestuous talent, afterward he is the great poet. For Goethe, on the other 
hand, this reflection is a foreign drop in his blood.]
In Max Heynacher’s 1905 book, Goethes Philosophie aus seinen Werken 
(Goethe’s Philosophy from His Works), we read the following:  “[Die Kantische 
Philosophie] war für Goethe nicht das Stahlbad, in das er wie Schiller aus 
verworrener Jugend niedertauchte, um sich in männlicher Klarheit daraus 
zu erheben. Nein, sie war ein fremder Tropfen in seinem Blute” ([Kantian 
philosophy] was not for Goethe the bracing mineral bath into which he, like 
Schiller, dove out of a confused youth, to rise from it in masculine clarity. No, 
it was a foreign drop in his blood).13 Karl Vorländer, in his 1907 collection, 
Kant—Schiller—Goethe, writes that “der Kritizismus [war] wirklich, wie man 
gesagt hat, ein fremder Tropfen in Goethes Blute” (the Critical Philosophy 
truly [was], as has been said, a foreign drop in Goethe’s blood).14 Neither 
Windelband nor Heynacher nor Vorländer back up this rather implausible 
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choice of metaphor by reasoned explanation; rather, it gains force by sheer 
repetition from author to author. Its pseudobiological criterion found expres-
sion furthermore in the work of Houston Chamberlain, who judged that 
if Goethe had encountered Kant any earlier in his life, “die Keime einer so 
durchdringenden Analyse des Denkens—des reifen Werkes eines gleichsam 
reif geborenen Mannes—[hätten] Goethe’s unbefangene Anschauungskraft 
bedroht”15 (the germs of so penetrating an analysis of thought—the mature 
work of a man who was, so to speak, born mature—[would have] threatened 
Goethe’s unspoiled powers of perception).
Thus blurring the line between “Beweisbares” and “Unbeweisbares” 
(things that are provable and things that are unprovable), Cohn proposes not 
only that Goethe saw certain elements of Kant’s philosophy as incompatible 
with his own thinking (which is certainly true, and provable), but that Kant’s 
ideas were somehow directly destructive of Goethe’s thought, and that he 
had suffered from contact with them (which is absurd, and of course unprov-
able). One effect of so dramatically overstating the distance between Goethe 
and Kant is that it makes it all the more necessary to explain how, despite the 
purported hostility, the “scheinbar durch eine Welt getrennten Ideen Goethes 
und Kants” (Cohn 286; ideas of Goethe and Kant, which appear to be a world 
apart from one another) could possibly still have been mediated. Cohn offers 
two scenarios.
In one rendition of events—which approaches the truth but which is 
mentioned only in passing—Cohn states that Goethe had responded to 
Kantian philosophy by creatively reconfiguring its ideas: “Goethe hat die 
Einwirkung erlitten—aber eben doch nicht erlitten, sondern den fremden 
Stoff sich fruchtbar umgestaltet” (Cohn 290; Goethe suffered from the impact 
of it—but then again didn’t suffer from it but rather reconfigured the foreign 
material in a manner fruitful for himself). Indeed, during his lifetime, Goethe’s 
interlocutors had been struck by the marked idiosyncrasy of his interpreta-
tion of Kant:  “es sei freilich ein Analogon Kantischer Vorstellungsart,” Goethe 
recalls being told, “aber ein seltsames” (it is, to be sure, an analogue of a 
Kantian mode of thought, but a peculiar one).16  That Goethe generated pecu-
liar “analogues” of Kantian ideas for use in his own intellectual projects is a 
fact borne out by a solid body of evidence.  That body of evidence was still in 
the process of being uncovered in Cohn’s time, though, and since the philo-
sophical pursuit of Weltanschauung staunchly refused to be beholden to 
philological pedantry, such facts could be systematically ignored. Cohn turns 
his attention, instead, to a fiction that was more in keeping with the fusion 
of fact and speculation that characterized the Geisteswissenschaften of his 
time.
In the alternative rendition of events—“the ‘condescending neo-Kantian’ 
narrative,” as Frederick Amrine has called it17—Goethe is presented as being 
incapable of processing Kant’s philosophy by himself and, therefore, as being 
in need of Schiller to aestheticize and soften it for him (Cohn 344):  “[Schiller] 
gab Goethe in der für ihn einzig möglichen Form, was dem Dichter von Kant 
förderlich werden konnte,” goes Cohn’s telling of it (Cohn 286; [Schiller] gave 
Goethe, in the only form that was possible for him, those aspects of Kant 
that could be productive for the poet). It is by virtue of his philosophical 
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prodding of Goethe that Schiller, according to Cohn, takes on part of his 
greatness within German intellectual history.  This understanding of events, 
which came to be widely accepted around this time, had the advantage of 
creating a usefully neat narrative: here, Goethe and Kant maintain their nec-
essary distance, while Schiller—who, until being upstaged by Goethe in the 
late nineteenth century, had been popularly upheld as the greatest German 
author—could reclaim first-order importance by virtue of the mediating role 
he played.  The only problem with this version of events, however, is that it 
simply is not true.
Goethe had first developed a serious interest in Kant’s philosophy upon 
his return from Italy in 1788 and—as Schiller himself attests—was eager to 
talk about Kant above all else during the months following the publication 
of the Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of the Power of Judgment) in spring 
1790.18 Schiller, meanwhile, had resisted his friend Körner’s encouragement 
to read Kant during the 1780s—he “was slow to develop” an interest in 
Kant,19 writes Frederick Beiser—and only in 1791 did he, with strenuous 
self-discipline, undertake the studies that he then put aside just a few years 
later (see Beiser 37–41).  This means that Goethe had begun to read Kant 
at least a year before Schiller did (“Goethe . . . in 1790 knew more about 
Kant than Schiller did,” affirms Nicholas Boyle20) and had thus been familiar 
with Kantian ideas for roughly five years before his regular interaction with 
Schiller began in 1794.21 Moreover, Goethe’s interest was primarily in the 
second part of the Kritik der Urteilskraft (the critique of teleological judg-
ment and the principles of natural science), and he was dismissive of the por-
tions on aesthetics. By contrast, Schiller’s interest in Kant was based largely 
on the first part of the Kritik der Urteilskraft (the aesthetics), and he took 
little notice of the ideas on science contained in the second part. If Schiller 
had been Goethe’s guide through Kantian thought, it would be necessary to 
explain how Schiller’s Kant-derived ideas on aesthetic education could possi-
bly have offered relevant tutelage for Goethe’s Kant-inspired practice of natu-
ral science. But Goethe states unambiguously that this was not the case; on 
the contrary:  “Schiller pflegte mir das Studium der Kantischen Philosophie 
zu widerraten. Er sagte gewöhnlich, Kant könne mir nichts geben” (Schiller 
tended to advise me against studying Kantian philosophy. He usually said that 
Kant could give me nothing).22  The fact that Goethe and Schiller both were 
engaged readers of Kant surely formed a crucial part of the intellectual bond 
between them; part of the fruitful difference between them lay in the fact 
that they were interested in distinctly different elements of that same phi-
losophy. In short, they were equal interlocutors in philosophical matters—
neither was the teacher of the other.
These facts can be clearly discerned and documented today, yet, due to 
the newness of the published primary documents at Cohn’s time, and com-
pounded by the particular brand of antiempirical intellectualism that refused 
to acknowledge new textual evidence even when it appeared, the myth of 
Schiller as go-between between Goethe and Kant became entrenched. If 
Goethe were acknowledged to have taken a serious interest in Kant, this 
would have spoiled the clean polar opposition that, as Cassirer suggests, 
lent structure and orientation to German intellectual culture.  There was, in 
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a sense, an a priori necessity for any juxtaposition of Goethe and Kant to be 
constructed as a violent tectonic “Zusammenstoß” (collision) rather than as a 
fruitful intersection.
Either/Or
During World War I, an even more urgent need was felt to establish clear con-
tours regarding this paradigmatic relationship. In a way that exemplifies the 
difficulties and absurdities inherent in this endeavor,  Theobald Ziegler can-
tankerously attempted to restore order to things in his 1914 book Goethes 
Welt- und Lebensanschauung (Goethe’s View of the World and of Life).  The 
juxtapositions “Goethe und Spinoza” and “Goethe und die Natur,” Ziegler 
writes, constitute “Goethes großes Ja” (Goethe’s great yes); the juxtaposition 
“Goethe und Kant,” on the other hand, constitutes “das Nein” (the no).23  With 
a tone of impatience, Ziegler drives home the maxim “Goethe und Kant 
gehören nicht zusammen” (Ziegler 56, emphasis in the original; Goethe 
and Kant do not belong together). From this standpoint, Ziegler proceeds 
to dismiss the position put forth by Houston Chamberlain, who, in his 1905 
book on Kant, had eagerly drawn attention to the “von fast allen Biographen 
Goethe’s geflissentlich unbeachtet gelassenes Verhältnis” (Chamberlain 
22–23; relationship, which has been deliberately left unnoticed by almost 
all biographers) between Goethe and Kant. Indeed, among the commenta-
tors of the day, Chamberlain was one of the few to exhibit genuine enthu-
siasm for the newfound connection between Goethe and Kant. Curiously, 
however, with regard to the well-established and seemingly uncontrover-
sial fact of Goethe’s interest in Spinoza, Chamberlain’s tone was markedly 
different:  “auf eine Polemik betreffs der üblichen Ausbeutung Goethe’s zu 
Gunsten Spinoza’s wollen wir keine Minute vergeuden” (Chamberlain 23; we 
do not wish to waste a single minute on a polemic with regard to the cus-
tomary exploitation of Goethe for the benefit of Spinoza).  This jarring rever-
sal, whereby Goethe’s Kantianism is affirmed and his Spinozism denied, was 
motivated, as Ziegler observes, simply “aus Antisemitismus” (out of anti-Sem-
itism). For the quintessentially German Goethe to be intellectually beholden 
to the Jewish Spinoza was plainly problematic for a thinker of Chamberlain’s 
ilk.  The hypothesis of a philosophical affiliation with Kant—whose Germanic 
credentials were unquestioned—offered a way to rehabilitate Goethe from 
an incriminating connection to Jewish culture.
In addition to Chamberlain, Ziegler goes on to ridicule “eine[n] dieser 
Neukantianer Marburger Observanz, Ludwig Goldschmidt, [der] in der 
Frankfurter Zeitung vom 23. Oktober 1909 diejenigen fast gar körperlich 
bedroht und in Verruf erklärt, die es fürderhin noch wagen würden, Goethe 
einen Spinozisten zu nennen” (Ziegler 55; one of these disciples of Marburg 
neo-Kantianism, Ludwig Goldschmidt, who, in the Frankfurter Zeitung of 
October 23, 1909, almost physically threatened and denounced those who 
henceforth would dare to call Goethe a Spinozist). Unlike in the case of 
Chamberlain, it is altogether unclear what warranted this attack. In the article 
cited, Goldschmidt argues that Goethe’s early interest in Spinoza was only a 
youthful phase that he later put definitively behind himself and, moreover, 
168 Michael Saman
that it was specifically his engagement with Kant’s philosophy that catalyzed 
this break:
Wo Goethes Spinozismus oder Pantheismus als Eideshelfer angerufen wird, 
geschieht dem Philosophen Goethe ebenso unrecht, wie etwa durch Hinweis 
auf frühere Schriften den Philosophen Hume und Kant, die sich beide von 
jugendlichen Auffassungen freigemacht haben. . . . Nach dem Studium Kants 
war ein Pantheismus des Philosophen Goethes [sic] nicht mehr möglich.24
[When Goethe’s Spinozism or pantheism is summoned as a witness, it is just as 
much of an injustice to the philosopher Goethe as when one refers to the early 
writings of Hume and Kant, both of whom emancipated themselves from the 
convictions of their youth. . . .  After his study of Kant, any pantheism on the part 
of the philosopher Goethe was no longer possible.]
While there is clearly a point of substantive disagreement between Ziegler 
and Goldschmidt, neither the tone nor the content of Goldschmidt’s article 
bears any correspondence to the way Ziegler characterizes it; the alleged 
threats of bodily harm appear simply to be products of Ziegler’s own agitated 
state of mind.
Beyond Chamberlain and Goldschmidt, however, the true cause of 
Ziegler’s indignation lay in the recent work of yet another neo-Kantian phi-
losopher, Karl Vorländer, who, on the basis of hitherto-unpublished mate-
rials now available in the Weimarer Ausgabe, had begun in the late 1890s 
to publish a series of articles that shed new light on Goethe’s relation to 
Kant and thereby had triggered the debates that Ziegler sought to counter-
act.25 Whereas for much of the nineteenth century, the question of Goethe 
and Kant had not been strongly thematized, newly emerging evidence now 
clearly demonstrated the fact—largely forgotten since his lifetime—that 
Goethe had cultivated a keen interest in Kant from the late 1780s through 
the last years of his life. In light of the intellectual paradigm shifts dis-
cussed above, however,  Vorländer was going against the current.  Whereas 
his arguments are made on the strength of concrete and specific textual 
evidence, such reliance on evidence was now widely seen as being anti-
thetical to the very spirit of Goethean genius; selective disregard for textual 
evidence functioned as proof that one’s assertions regarding Goethe were 
authentic. Due to these attitudes, the reaction against Vorländer was virtu-
ally preprogrammed. “Goethe’sche Zitate aufsuchen und sie zusammenstel-
len kann jeder,” we read in a hostile commentary by Rudolf Steiner; “sie im 
Sinne Goethe’scher Weltanschauung deuten, kann jedenfalls Herr Vorländer 
nicht”26 (Anybody can seek out Goethean quotations and anthologize them; 
interpreting them in light of Goethean Weltanschauung, however, is some-
thing Mr.  Vorländer, for one, cannot do). Rudolf Lehmann, who had been 
one of the advocates of the turn away from philological method, questioned 
the legitimacy of using any primary documents at all beyond Goethe’s main 
literary works:
[G]esprächsweise Aeusserungen und Briefe, die von der Goethephilologie als 
die unmittelbaren Quellen angesehen und der Erklärung der Werke soweit 
wie möglich zu Grunde gelegt werden, . . . stellen nur das Wandelbare dar. Sie 
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sind von aussen hervorgerufen und zeigen uns, wie Goethe auf die Aussenwelt 
reagierte.  Aber sie offenbaren nicht sein eigenstes persönliches, geschweige 
denn sein künstlerisches Wesen. (Lehmann 344)
[Conversational remarks and letters, which are regarded by Goethe philology 
as direct sources and are used to the fullest extent possible as a foundation for 
the explanation of his works, . . . represent only that which is inconstant.  They 
are elicited by outside events and show us how Goethe responded to the 
outside world. But they do not reveal his own most personal—let alone his 
artistic—essence.]
A serious historian of philosophy,  Vorländer was on the whole a per-
ceptive and sympathetic reader of Goethe. His research, while certainly not 
beyond criticism,27 is by and large solid and impressively thorough:
So habe ich die Beziehungen Goethes zu Kant, wie sie sich historisch entwi-
ckelt haben, an der Hand der besten Quellen unparteiisch darzulegen versucht. 
Da ich keinerlei vorgefasstes Ziel im Auge hatte, kein anderes wenigstens als die 
objektive Wahrheit, so habe ich in erster Linie diese Quellen sprechen lassen. 
(Vorländer 131; emphasis in the original)28
[Thus, I have attempted to document Goethe’s relationship to Kant impartially, 
as it developed historically, using the best sources. Since I didn’t have a precon-
ceived goal in mind—at least none other than the objective truth—I have first 
and foremost let those sources speak for themselves.]
When Vorländer first began to publish his findings, therefore, he was confi-
dent that new and fruitful territory in Goethe scholarship was being opened 
up. “Hier betraten wir sozusagen Neuland,” he would later recall proudly 
(Vorländer vii; Here we entered, so to speak, uncharted territory).  The barrier 
between Goethe and Kant had at last been breached.  Yet his affiliation with 
neo-Kantianism marked him, to partisans of Goethe, as an opponent, and his 
challenge to accepted views regarding Goethe and Kant was construed as 
an impertinent disruption of ideological order and clarity. Ziegler protested:
Da wurde das alles plötzlich auf den Kopf gestellt und uns gesagt, seit Beginn 
der neunziger Jahre sei Goethe unter den Einfluß Kants geraten, dadurch von 
Spinoza abgekommen und schließlich durch Schiller ganz für Kant gewonnen, 
geradezu zu einem Jünger Kants gemacht worden. (Ziegler 54–55)
[Then suddenly everything was turned on its head, and we were told that since 
the beginning of the 1790s, Goethe had come under Kant’s influence, had 
thereby been led away from Spinoza, and finally been won over fully for Kant 
by Schiller—virtually made into Kant’s apostle.]
Vorländer, to be sure, asserted no such thing—yet almost immediately, the 
notion of a “Vorländerscher Mythus” (Vorländerian myth) began to take hold 
(Vorländer 262). Bringing attention to Vorländer’s identity as “einer von 
den Marburger Neukantianern, die überhaupt alles Große und Bedeutsame 
in der Geistesgeschichte unseres deutschen Volkes und seiner jüngsten 
Vergangenheit auf Kant zurückführen und auf seinen Namen getauft wis-
sen wollen” (Ziegler 55; one of the Marburg neo-Kantians, who in every 
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case want to see everything great and meaningful in the intellectual his-
tory of our German people, and its recent past, as being derived from Kant 
and baptized in his name), Ziegler makes his own allegiances unambigu-
ous. Engaging in a starkly partisan struggle over claims to cultural prop-
erty, Ziegler holds that meaning and greatness in German intellectual cul-
ture must be ascribed either to Goethe or to Kant, and any equivocation 
between these alternatives cannot be tolerated. “Man kann natürlich Kant 
und Goethe hochstellen und bewundern,” Ziegler declares, “wie Goethe 
selbst Kant für den größten Philosophen erklärt hat: aber Kantianer und 
Goetheaner zugleich kann man nicht sein, sondern immer nur eines von bei-
den. Darüber darf man sich nicht täuschen oder täuschen lassen” (Ziegler 69, 
emphases in the original; One can of course celebrate and admire Kant and 
Goethe, just as Goethe declared Kant to be the greatest philosopher. But 
one cannot be a Kantian and a Goethean at the same time, but always only 
one of the two. In this regard one must not deceive oneself nor let oneself 
be deceived).  Thus, while acknowledging in passing that Goethe really did 
hold Kant in the highest regard,  Ziegler quickly shifts attention away from 
this concession by insisting that, for the contemporary reader, an either/
or decision nonetheless exists. Normative imperatives for the present sup-
plant historical assertions about the past; at stake is what “we” can think or 
be—not what Goethe thought or was.  Though Goethe himself had, from 
his return from Italy onward, tempered his early “genius” with ever more 
methodical reflection (significantly influenced by Kant, among others), for 
Ziegler, no such mixing of intuition and reason is permissible. Goethe and 
Kant—metonymically identified with intuition and reason—were to be kept 
separate.
Objectivity versus Truth
In the 1916 biography of Goethe by Friedrich Gundolf, we find, arguably, 
the classic of neo-Romantic Goethe reverence.  As a necessary complement, 
though, to the determinedly tendentious idealization of Goethe presented 
in this work, there occurs also a pronounced deprecation of Kant.  A pro-
tégé of Stefan George, Gundolf in many ways exemplifies the intellectual 
trends we have seen unfolding: attempting a holistic, ahistorical, supertem-
poral representation of Goethe’s existence as a quasi-organic intellectual 
and spiritual unity, Gundolf emphasizes the anti-Enlightenment aspects of 
Goethe’s thought and, writing in a speculative and highly aestheticized style, 
elegantly blurs the distinction between the critic and the artist. In light of 
the distinctive cast of Gundolf’s method, Ernst Osterkamp has character-
ized him as being a “Wissenschaftskünstler” (scholarly artist) rather than a 
“Wissenschaftler” (scholar).29 Gundolf’s blurring of the line distinguishing 
the twentieth-century critic from the eighteenth-century author caused a 
sensation among Goethe critics: “Dass es geschrieben werden konnte, dass 
es in den Fachkreisen anerkannt wird,” wrote Lehmann, “ist ein Zeichen des 
erfreulichen Umschwungs, der sich in der deutschen Literaturwissenschaft 
seit einiger Zeit angebahnt hat und nunmehr entschieden hervortritt” 
(Lehmann 341; That it could be written, and that it receives recognition 
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among specialists, is a sign of a fortunate change of direction in German liter-
ary scholarship that has been developing for some time and is now coming 
decisively to the fore).
To the extent, though, that Gundolf’s work represents the apogee of post-
positivist Goetheanism, it also—inevitably?—falls into the fixed clichés of the 
Goethe-Kant opposition. Gundolf’s celebration of Goethe is without limits:
Goethe war der einzige im höchsten Sinn schöpferische, sinnliche und der ein-
zige im höchsten Sinn zugleich philosophische Geist der um 1790 wenigstens 
für seine Person über ein allgemein Gültiges in der Dichtkunst ins klare gekom-
men und über bloßes empirisches Tappen hinaus gelangt war. . . . [E]r war der 
einzige der, selbst wenn er nur seiner Natur folgte, nicht in bloße Empirie ver-
fiel, der einzige als Person schon gesetzliche deutsche Dichter, eine unerreichte 
Einheit von Individualität und Normalität, nicht nur eine große Persönlichkeit, 
sondern wie Nietzsche formuliert “eine Kultur,” ein Niveau, ein Gesetz durch 
bloßes Dasein, kurz, ein Vorbild.30
[Goethe was the only—in the highest sense—creative, sensual, and—in the 
highest sense—also philosophical intellect around 1790 who, at least as far as 
his own person was concerned, arrived at something universally valid in poetic 
art and managed to move beyond mere empirical groping about. . . . [H]e was 
the only one who, even when he was simply following his nature, never lapsed 
into mere empiricism; the only German poet who, as a person, took on the 
character of law; an unparalleled unity of individuality and normativity; not just 
a great personality but, as Nietzsche formulates it, “a culture,” a level, a law by 
dint of sheer existence—in short, a model.]
The concomitant diminution of Kant, meanwhile, is telling. Gundolf asserts 
that Kant constituted “unter den großen Philosophen vielleicht am wenigs-
ten eine Gestalt” (among all great philosophers, perhaps least of all a person-
ality).  Whereas philosophers from Plato to Spinoza had been strong enough 
figures to stand as “Sinnbilder ihrer Systeme, nicht nur Urheber, sondern 
Schöpfer und Träger ihrer Systeme” (symbols of their systems, not only the 
authors but also the creative and representative forces of their systems), Kant 
was dependent on Schiller to make his abstract ideas interesting to the genius 
of sensory thought, Goethe. Operating on the false presumption that Goethe 
had never independently read Kant, Gundolf depicts the situation as follows: 
“Das Reich Kants schickte Schillern gleichsam als Gesandten an Goethe—
hier war Gestalt,  Vertretung und lebendige Wirkung der Philosophie men-
schlich faßbar, und schon die bloße Erscheinung Schillers gab Goethe über 
Kantische Philosophie wenn nicht objektiv richtigeren, so doch persönlich 
fruchtbareren, das heißt ja für Goethe wahreren Aufschluß als etwa die 
Lektüre der drei Kritiken” (Gundolf 479–80, emphases in the original;  The 
kingdom of Kant sent Schiller to Goethe as an ambassador, so to speak. Here, 
the form, the representation, and the vital effects of philosophy became fath-
omable in human terms, and already the mere appearance of Schiller gave 
Goethe insight into Kantian philosophy that was, if not objectively more cor-
rect, nonetheless personally more fruitful—which means for Goethe truer—
than a reading of the three Critiques). It is, according to Gundolf, precisely 
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by purportedly not having read the Critiques that Goethe arrives at a truer 
Kantianism than he would have had if he actually had read them—the prima 
facie absurdity of this requires little comment.  Yet the assertion is useful as 
an encapsulation of Gundolf’s mode of thought: something that is objectively 
inaccurate can nonetheless be truer than objective facts; what we can feel 
may well be truer than what we can prove. “Ich will nicht der schöngeistigen 
Schwärmerei das Wort reden,” Gundolf writes;
die Exaktheit und Reinlichkeit ist selbstverständliche Vorraussetzung jeder wis-
senschaftlichen Beschäftigung mit dem Werk des Genius, sie vor allem ist das 
Siegel einer ernsten Hingabe an ihn: aber die Methode darf nie Selbstzweck 
werden, und philologische Kritik nie übergreifen von der Reinigung der Papiere 
und Drucke zum Gebild und Geist selbst. . . . Fragen wir uns von Zeit zu Zeit: 
warum erforschen wir des Dichters Werk, aus äußerem Zufall oder aus einem 
inneren Bedürfnis? so werden wir uns auch über die Grenzen unserer Mittel, d. 
h. über die richtige Methode klar. (Gundolf 7–8, emphasis in the original)
[I don’t wish to plead the cause of effete and fanciful intellectualism; exacti-
tude and pristineness are self-evident preconditions of any scholarly treatment 
of the work of a genius; it above all else is the insignia of a serious dedication 
to genius. But the method must never become an end in itself, and philological 
criticism must never be allowed to overstep its bounds, from the bringing of 
papers and writings into pristine form, to the artistic construct and the intel-
lect itself. . . . If we ask ourselves from time to time, Why do we investigate 
the poet’s work, because of some external contingency or because of an inner 
necessity?, then we also gain clarity regarding the limits of our means, that is to 
say, regarding the correct method.]
Having thus asserted the primacy of inner necessity over objectivity, of 
“Gebild und Geist” (artistic construct and intellect) over the written word, 
Gundolf is able with unwavering certainty to reaffirm the already-familiar 
 principle: “[Goethe] ist nicht, wie neuerdings absurderweise behauptet 
worden ist, ein Schüler Kants, sondern der äußerste Gegensatz der in 
Deutschland gegen Kantische Denk- und Fühlweise überhaupt zu  finden 
ist” (quoted in Vorländer 262–63; [Goethe] is not, as has recently and 
absurdly been asserted, a pupil of Kant’s but rather the uttermost opposite 
of the Kantian way of thinking and feeling that can possibly be found in 
Germany).  With this declaration, the position was indelibly canonized.
Vorländer would protest in a reply to Gundolf, “Wir Deutsche . . . sollten 
beide froh verehren, in dem tröstenden Bewußtsein, daß die Parole nicht zu 
heißen braucht: Kant gegen Goethe, oder Goethe gegen Kant, sondern daß 
sie lauten darf: Kant und Goethe” (Vorländer 272, emphases in the original; 
We Germans . . . should gladly honor both, taking solace in knowing that 
the slogan need not be “Kant versus Goethe” or “Goethe versus Kant,” but 
that it may also be “Kant and Goethe”).31 With his thinking going so clear-
ly against the currents of the day, however, and with Gundolf’s thinking 
so effectively articulating those currents,  Vorländer’s comparatively level-
headed attempt at a conciliation of Goethe and Kant had little chance of 
gaining traction.
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Either/Or versus Both/And
“Ein Buch wie das Gundolfsche ist man natürlich berechtigt als ganzes anzuer-
kennen oder abzulehnen, insoweit darüber nicht Gründe verstandesmäßiger 
Kritik, sondern die Richtung des geistigen Seins entscheidet,” writes Georg 
Simmel in his 1917 review of Gundolf’s Goethe. “Denn ein solches Werk ist 
doch nicht wie eine Rechnung, deren Gesamtresultat negativ wird, wenn 
ein einzelnes Glied es ist; dies Gesamtresultat überhaupt darf man wirklich 
nicht aus dem quantitativen Verhältnis zwischen dem Anerkannten und dem 
Widerlegten errechnen wollen” (One is, of course, entitled to acknowledge 
or to reject wholesale a book such as Gundolf’s, insofar as it is not the princi-
ples of rationalistic critique that serve as criteria but rather the orientation of 
intellectual being. For such a work is, of course, not like an arithmetic calcula-
tion, the end result of which is false if a single part of it is; in general, one must 
not wish to ascertain its end result out of the quantitative relation between 
what has been acknowledged and what has been refuted).32 As a corrective 
to fault-finding “intellectualism,” as he refers to positivist criticism, Simmel 
advocates a radically “affirmative” mode of thought that would instead prior-
itize “geistiges Sein” (intellectual being) over empirical fact. Goethe, Simmel 
believes, stands as “das erhabenste Beispiel der Positivität des Aufnehmens” 
(the most sublime example of positive reception).33
In the years prior to the war, Germans had enjoyed the luxury of being 
selective: “In sozialer wie in religiöser, in künstlerischer wie in politischer, 
in personaler wie in wissenschaftlicher Hinsicht, haben wir unzählige Werte 
verneint, weil mit ihrem Positiven anderes verbunden war, das wir verwerfen 
mußten” (In social as well as religious, in artistic as well as political, in person-
al as well as scholarly matters, we have negated uncounted values because 
other things, which we had to discard, were connected with their positive 
aspects), Simmel writes in his Gundolf review.  The time of peace, though, 
in which such carefree wastefulness could be afforded, was now over.  After 
the outbreak of war, the urgency of the present and the uncertainty of the 
future called, according to Simmel, for precisely the brand of neo-Romantic 
Goetheanism presented by Gundolf.  Therefore, Simmel dramatically inter-
weaves elements of Goethe-cum-Gundolf aestheticism with the future pros-
pects of the German nation itself.
Die Hoffnung auf ein in sich harmonischeres, gefestigt bleibendes Deutschland 
ruht auf einer ganz geänderten Einstellung, darauf, daß deren bestimmender 
Ton auf das Positive rückt, das der eine vom anderen nehmen, an ihm aner-
kennen kann, daß Personen und Parteien sich in wachsendem Maß an das-
jenige an Personen und Parteien halten, wozu sie Ja sagen können und, 
unter Vorbehalt der unvermeidlichen Lebensbasierung auf Ja und Nein, sich 
öfter und öfter der Nietzscheschen Tafel erinnern: “Wo man nicht lieben 
kann, soll man vorübergehen.” Es scheint mir nicht unverhältnismäßig, dieses 
Allgemeinsten in der Zeit zu gedenken, wo an dem größten Heros deutscher 
Kultur—der zugleich ihr größter Ja-Sager war—dieses Buch [Gundolf’s Goethe] 
erwachsen ist.  Vieles daran mag der eine, vieles der andere verneinen; aber zu 
irgendwelchem Wesentlichen darin wird auch der prinzipiell anders Gerichtete 
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Ja sagen müssen. Und ob das geistige Deutschland dieses und nicht jenes in 
den Punkt des schärfsten Sehens rückt, wird ein Symbol dafür sein können, 
ob jene Umstellung des deutschen Geistes auf das Positive—deren Gegenteil 
wir uns nun nicht mehr gestatten können—sich zu vollziehen beginnt; und 
wird damit den tiefen Zusammenhang offenbaren, in dem diese zukunftver-
bürgende Umstellung und die Rechtsbegrenzung des Intellektualismus unserer 
Vergangenheit sich gegenseitig bedingen. (Simmel, “Goethebuch,” 243)
[The hope for an internally harmonious Germany that will retain its fortitude 
rests upon a complete transformation of attitude; it rests upon the determining 
tone of this attitude shifting toward that which is positive, which one person 
may take from the other, acknowledge in the other; it rests upon persons and 
parties increasingly holding to that in persons and parties to which they can 
say yes; and—under the condition of life’s inevitable foundation upon yes and 
no—upon their recollection of the Nietzschean inscription “Where one can-
not love, one should pass by.” It seems to me not inappropriate to recall this 
most universal principle at a time when around the greatest hero of German 
culture—who was at the same time its greatest affirmer—this book [Gundolf’s 
Goethe] has grown.  There is much in it that one person might negate, and 
much that another person might negate, but to some essential element with-
in it, even he who has a fundamentally different orientation will have to say 
yes.  And whether intellectual Germany moves the latter [the essential aspects 
of the book] and not the former [those aspects that can be negated] into the 
focal point of its sharpest gaze can stand as a symbol of whether this reorienta-
tion of the German intellect toward the affirmative is beginning to be accom-
plished—the opposite of which we indeed can ill afford.  And this will reveal 
the deep connection by which this reorientation, which vouchsafes our future, 
and the delimitation of the intellectualism of our past are mutual necessities.]
In the 1916 revision of his book Goethe und Kant, Simmel sketches the 
major contours of the preceding century of German thought using Goethe 
and Kant as the two poles between which it moved. Reaction against specu-
lative idealism, he writes, had led to the rise of materialist philosophy in the 
1850s and 1860s, after which the need for a synthesis of idealism and materi-
alism had led, in the 1870s, to the call “Zurück zu Kant!” (Back to Kant!).  Yet 
this return to Kant was a strictly “wissenschaftliche Lösung” (scholarly 
solution), he continues, the rigorous scientificity of which “forderte einen 
Ausgleich” (demanded a counterbalance).  The neo-Romantic aestheticism 
that had emerged since the turn of the century represented this necessary 
counterweight and announced itself with the call “Zurück zu Goethe!”34
Did it follow, then, that the near future would bring a renewed return 
to Kant? Far from endorsing a continuation of this simple back-and-forth, 
Simmel makes a much bolder prediction: “Für die Weltanschauung der jetzt 
wohl abgeschlossenen Geistesperiode bleibt der Besitz, den wir an den 
Parteien haben, an die Formel gebunden: Kant oder Goethe! Die kommende 
Epoche aber wird vielleicht im Zeichen von Kant und Goethe stehen, jede 
flaue Vermittlung zwischen ihnen ablehnend, ihre begrifflichen Gegensätze 
nicht ‘versöhnend,’ aber sie durch die Tatsache ihres Erlebtwerdens ver-
neinend” (Simmel, Kant und Goethe 116–17, emphases in the original; For 
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the Weltanschauung of the intellectual epoch that has now evidently come 
to a close, the stake we have in the parties remains bound to the formula Kant 
or Goethe! The coming epoch, however, will perhaps stand under the auspic-
es of Kant and Goethe, rejecting every feeble mediation between them; not 
“reconciling” their conceptual oppositions, yet negating them through the 
fact of living them). Simmel is not interested in reconciling Goethe and Kant 
but in fact wishes to accentuate the polarity between them—only then to 
posit that a future Germany will be able to embody both antithetical models 
simultaneously. Such transcendence of oppositions becomes a central figure 
in Simmel’s expressly Goethe-inspired mode of thinking.35 In the 1915 essay 
“Einheit und Zwiespalt:  Zeitgemäßes in Goethes Weltanschauung” (Unity and 
Discord: Timely Elements in Goethe’s Weltanschauung), he develops this 
line of thought further:
Wir alle sind überzeugt, daß Wahnsinn und Verbrechen diesen Krieg entzün-
det haben; und wenn uns nun die Aufgabe zufällt, diesen Widersinn zum Sinn 
zu gestalten, ein erneuertes, reineres, verinnerlichtes Deutschland, ja vielleicht 
Europa aus ihm heraus zu gewinnen—was anderes ist es, als eine Verwirklichung 
jener Goetheschen Weltformel: daß die Zerrissenheit, der Gegenwert, der leid-
voll sinnlose Widerspruch, daß alle Gegensätze zu Harmonie und Einheit doch 
ein geheimnisvolles Zusammen mit eben diesen Werten bilden? Daß, wo immer 
das Leben Wirklichkeit und Wert auseinanderführt, ein letzter mächtigster 
Sinn seiner auch diesen Gegensatz zu seinen unmittelbaren Erwünschtheiten 
umgreift, daß schließlich in Zerstören und Erhalten, im Leben und im Tode der 
Individuen, ja in Sinn und Widersinn die große Einheit des Weltlebens flutet? 
(Simmel, “Einheit und Zwiespalt,” 172–73, emphases in the original)
[We are all convinced that madness and criminality ignited this war.  And if the 
task now falls to us of forming this nonsense into sense, and gaining from it a 
renewed, purer, more inward Germany—indeed, perhaps even Europe—then 
what else is this than the realization of that Goethean world formula: that the 
bitter strife, the countervalue, the miserably senseless contradiction, that all the 
opposites of harmony and unity do after all form a mysterious conjunction 
with these very values? That wherever life rends asunder reality and value, its 
final, most powerful meaning encompasses even this opposition to its immedi-
ate desirabilities; that ultimately the great unity of worldly life flows in destroy-
ing and in sustaining, in the life and in the death of individuals, in meaning and 
in meaninglessness?]
Just as he had rejected any “flaue Vermittlung” (feeble mediation) between 
Goethe and Kant, Simmel stresses that he does not seek a “versöhnlicher 
Schluß” (conciliatory conclusion) to the violent tensions of the day, but rath-
er a robust sharpening of their harshest contrasts. For Simmel, to be able 
existentially to unify even these extremes is what constitutes a genuinely 
“Goethean” mode of being. “Diese Einheit ist auch nichts Friedliches, Ideales, 
Wundenheilendes,” he writes, “denn sie steht auch über diesem Pol des 
Gegensatzes. Sie ist das göttliche Leben des Weltganzen, das wir, mit Goethes 
Worten zu reden, nur ‘schweigend verehren’ können” (Simmel, “Einheit und 
Zwiespalt,” 173;  This unity is also nothing peaceful, ideal, and healing, for it 
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too stands above this pole of the opposition. It is the divine life of the whole 
of the world, which we—to phrase it in Goethe’s words—can only “silently 
honor”).  Apparently seeking to transcend the law of noncontradiction with 
this remarkable simultaneity of opposites, Simmel envisions an intellectual 
and spiritual future that logic can only fail to capture.  The hubristic notion 
of embodying both Goethe and Kant becomes emblematic of the proposed 
ethos. Like Werther declaring to Wilhelm his determination “zwischen dem 
Entweder-Oder durchzustehlen” (to steal through between the either-or), 
Simmel, too, places felt necessity above rational possibility.36
Neither/Nor
“Die Frucht des Unsinns ist reif,” judged Ludwig Goldschmidt in 1920, survey-
ing the state of German thought at the war’s end. “Unwahrhaftigkeit in Rede 
und Schrift kannte in diesem Maße die Vergangenheit in Deutschland nicht” 
(The fruit of nonsense is ripe. . . . In the past, Germany knew no disingenuous-
ness of this dimension in the spoken and written word).37 With bitterness 
and disappointment, Goldschmidt concludes that the nation was, at this junc-
ture, simply no longer in a position to engage with its greatest minds from 
the past; “unsere Zeit,” he writes, “[ist] jener klassischen Literaturperiode 
nicht gewachsen” (our time does not measure up to that classical era of 
literature).  Whereas for some two decades now, intellectuals had sought 
to experience Goethe as if he were living and breathing in the present, 
Goldschmidt declares any intellectual continuity with Goethe’s age to have 
collapsed:  “Zwischen unserer Zeit und dem 18.  Jahrhundert klafft eine 
Lücke, die Schriftsteller des 18.  Jahrhunderts sind uns in philosophischen 
Fragen nicht verständlich, das Verständnis würde dieselbe Vernunftkultur 
voraussetzen, die damals herrschend war” (Goldschmidt 6; Between our time 
and the eighteenth century lies a yawning gap.  The writers of the eighteenth 
century are not intelligible to us today concerning philosophical questions; 
an understanding of them would require the same culture of reason that was 
dominant at that time). Rejecting, therefore, any polemics over the merits of 
“Kant und Goethe” versus “Kant oder Goethe,” Goldschmidt pointedly gives 
his book the title Weder Kant noch Goethe (Neither Kant nor Goethe).
“‘Weder Kant noch Goethe’ war der Gedanke,” Goldschmidt explains, 
“der sich beim Lesen der Simmelschen Alternative ‘Kant oder Goethe,’ ‘Kant 
und Goethe’ aufdrängte” (Goldschmidt 35; “Neither Kant nor Goethe” was 
the thought that presented itself to me when I read Simmel’s alternatives, 
“Kant or Goethe” and “Kant and Goethe”).  Yet the formulation should not be 
construed, he stresses, as proposing “eine[-] Philosophie des ‘Wedernoch’” (a 
“neither-nor” philosophy) or as rejecting or critiquing Goethe or Kant them-
selves. On the contrary, “Verfasser verehrt beide Männer,” he writes;
er hofft auch in ihrem Sinne zu schreiben.  Was aber soll ständige Wiederholung 
ihrer Namen? Mag sie rühmen und preisen, wer sie verstanden hat, als 
Aushängeschilder und Folie für eigene Weisheit stehen sie zu hoch. Ihr Erbe, 
ja auch nur ihre Person zu würdigen, setzt wie die Würdigung ihrer Zeit viel-
erlei voraus, was heute im allgemeinen Bewußtsein fehlt. Peinvoll, wenn beide 
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vorgeführt werden und gar als Programme für philosophische Meinungen, 
wofür sie selbst sich bedanken würden. (Goldschmidt 3–4)
[The author [Goldschmidt himself] honors both men, and he also hopes to 
be writing in their spirit. But what good is constant repetition of their names? 
Whoever has understood them may laud and praise them, but they are too 
exalted to be placards or templates for one’s own wisdom.  To honor their leg-
acy, or even just their person, requires—just as honoring their epoch does—
much that is missing from general consciousness today. It is an utter embarrass-
ment when both are paraded about, even used as programs for philosophical 
opinions that they themselves would have wanted nothing to do with.]
Whereas so many commentators of Goldschmidt’s time—Simmel being his 
key target—displayed what he calls “die heutige merkwürdige Überlegenheit” 
(the peculiar superiority characteristic of our day) vis-à-vis the past, 
Goldschmidt himself sees the reverse as being the case: the early twentieth 
century had fallen hopelessly below the standards of the German tradition. 
“Wie war es möglich,” he asks, “daß im deutschen Lande, dessen Gelehrte sich 
Jahrhunderte hindurch vor allen anderen durch Gründlichkeit auszeichneten, 
sich Erscheinungen an die Oberfläche drängen, die jedes Verständnis, jede 
Bemühung um den behandelten Gegenstand vermissen lassen, ja, was noch 
schlimmer ist,  Worte und Sätze enthalten, denen der Urheber keinen Sinn, 
kein Beispiel zur Seite stellen könnte?” (Goldschmidt 6–7; How is it possible 
that in the German lands, whose scholars for centuries distinguished them-
selves above all others by their thoroughness, phenomena force their way to 
the surface that are devoid of any understanding of, or attention to, the object 
in question—indeed, what is even worse, contain words and phrases that 
the author can substantiate with no reason, no example?).  The quixotic aim 
to find Goethean genius in ourselves had led to a solipsistic absorption in 
contemporary concerns that ultimately, paradoxically, excluded Goethe him-
self from the picture. Scholarship such as Simmel’s, observes Goldschmidt, 
was marked by the “heute unumgängliche ‘persönliche Note’” (the “personal 
note” that is obligatory today)—the emphasis, that is, on the way “we” experi-
ence Goethe’s thought rather than on Goethe’s thought in its own right. “Wer 
die ‘wir’ sind,” however, “. . . erfahren wir nicht” (Goldschmidt 5; who the “we” 
is . . .  we do not find out). Ziegler’s sharp either/or and Simmel’s visionary 
both/and thus yield after the war’s end to the bitter resignation of a neither/
nor.  The underlying question, meanwhile, of who exactly “we” are remains 
very much uncertain.
Classicism versus Bolshevism
Goldschmidt’s humility, of course, was not the response of all German 
intellectuals to the situation. In the Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen 
(Observations of an Unpolitical Man),  Thomas Mann expresses undeterred 
belief in the “sendungsvolle Eigenart und Majestät deutschen Geistes” 
(unique and majestic mission of the German intellect) and states that the 
war was not only “ein Krieg um Macht und Geschäft” (a war over power and 
commerce) but also “ein Krieg zwischen Ideen” (a war between ideas).38 
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Goethe and Kant, configured within this view of things, take on explicit 
political functions. “Wir haben von Kant . . . den sozialen Befehl” (From Kant 
we have . . .  The social command), he writes. “[Das] kriegerisch-kategorische 
Einschreiten Kants gegen die völlige Liberalisierung der Welt” (Mann 305; 
[the] warrior-like categorical intervention of Kant against the complete 
liberalization of the world) serves, according to Mann, to halt the advance 
of decadent Western nihilism. (Unsurprisingly, in light of these comments, 
Mann concedes that he has never read Kant “gelehrterweise” [Mann 191; 
in a scholarly fashion].) Goethe, meanwhile, is cast as the guarantor of the 
intrinsically antiliberal fabric of German political culture:  “Eine Nation erlebt 
nicht einen Geist, wie diesen, sie bringt ihn gar nicht hervor,” he asserts, 
“ohne sich zur Politik, zu ‘modernen Ideen,’ zu den generösen Zauber- und 
Schwindelworten Menschheit, Freiheit, Gleichheit, Revolution, Fortschritt 
von je und auf immer anders zu verhalten, als die anderen” (Mann 305;  A 
nation does not experience an intellect such as this one, and does not bring 
it into being, without forever onward comporting itself differently from the 
others toward politics, toward “modern ideas,” toward the magnanimous 
magical smoke-and-mirrors words “humanity,” “freedom,” “equality,” “revolu-
tion,” and “progress”).
When Oswald Spengler was able—“trotz des Elends und Ekels dieser 
Jahre” (despite the misery and disgust of these years)—to recover what he 
considered to be a form of authentically “German” philosophy, it was for-
mulated expressly in the name of Goethe.39  The war, he wrote in 1917, had 
proved necessary in order for his philosophical worldview to take shape; he 
hoped that Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West) would 
be able to claim its place proudly alongside Germany’s military accomplish-
ments (Spengler x–xi). For Spengler’s ambitious synthesis of world history, 
Goethean morphology provided the model; twentieth-century paradigms 
could only fall short of what this project demanded.
Ich frage mich, wenn ich das Buch eines modernen Denkers zur Hand nehme, 
was er vom Tatsächlichen der Weltpolitik, von den großen Problemen der 
Weltstädte, des Kapitalismus, der Zukunft des Staates, des Verhältnisses der 
Technik zum Ausgang der Zivilisation, des Russentums, der Wissenschaft 
überhaupt ahnt. Goethe hätte das alles verstanden und geliebt.  Von lebenden 
Philosophen übersieht es nicht einer. (Spengler 60)
[I wonder, whenever I pick up a book by a modern thinker, whether he even 
has an inkling regarding the reality of world politics, the great problems of the 
world metropolises, capitalism, the future of the state, the relationship between 
technology and the end of civilization, Russian character, or science. Goethe 
would have understood and loved all of it.  Among living philosophers, not a 
single one can get the big picture.]
Spengler is furthermore staunchly dismissive of any attempt to find truth 
through philosophical systems in the manner of Kant: “ein Ethiker vom 
Schlage Kants ist niemals Menschenkenner” (Spengler 720; an ethicist in 
the manner of Kant can never really understand humankind). He holds up 
Goethe, by contrast, as a model of how to grasp truth synthetically rather than 
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analytically: “die Ehrfurcht vor dem Geheimnis—die Ehrfurcht Goethes—
[hindert uns], begriffliche Zergliederungen für Tiefblicke zu halten” (rever-
ence for mystery—Goethe’s reverence—[prevents us] from regarding con-
ceptual dissections as profound insights).  As opposed to academic philoso-
phy, which, on Spengler’s view, merely generates ever more “Fachliteratur” 
(specialized academic literature), Goethean thinking is presented as a vital 
source of cultural and historical orientation. (Spengler viii)
A few years later, philosopher and later Nazi ideologue Alfred Baeumler 
conceived his two-volume study of the Kritik der Urteilskraft in light of the 
“neuen Gesichtspunkten” (new perspectives) with which he had returned 
from the battlefields of World War I; accordingly, he presents his philo-
sophical motivations explicitly in terms of national cultural  politics.40  The 
essential continuity and integrity of German Geistesleben (intellectual 
life), he believes, must be reaffirmed: “Das Problem Kant und Goethe ist 
nur ein konzentrierter Auszug dieses umfassenderen Problems unserer 
historischen Erkenntnis. Eine klare Vorstellung von der Entwicklung des 
Fühlens und Denkens der Zeit, die etwa von 1670 bis 1830 reicht, ist nicht 
nur eine aus dem heutigen Stande der geisteswissenschaftlichen Forschung 
hervorgehende Forderung, sondern auch ein im Leben des Einzelnen 
leben dig empfundenes Bedürfnis” (Baeumler vii; The problem of Kant and 
Goethe is only one concentrated element extracted from this more com-
prehensive problem of our historical understanding.  A clear conception of 
the development of feeling and thinking during the time that spans from 
approximately 1670 to 1830 is not only a demand that arises from the state 
of humanistic research in our day but also a vitally felt necessity in the life 
of the individual).  A central aim in revisiting Kant is thus to reclaim for the 
present “ein[en] Lebensstil, ein[en] Charakter” (a mode of life, a character) 
that Baeumler terms “classical” (Baeumler v–vi)—ways of “feeling and think-
ing” exemplified by figures such as Bach and Beethoven, Leibniz and Kant, 
Lessing and Goethe. “Der geistige Komplex, den die Namen dieser Männer 
bezeichnen,” writes Baeumler,
ist heute in Gefahr. Die Jugend wendet sich von ihm als Ganzem ab. Sie 
sucht ihre Führer lieber in Rußland als in Königsberg und Weimar; der 
 kostbare Besitz des deutschen Idealismus droht zu einem mehr oder  weniger 
 pietätvoll be trachteten Inventarstück einer abgelaufenen (“bürgerlichen”) 
Epoche zu werden. Bei dieser Sachlage bleibt uns nur die Wahl, den Gehalt an 
Menschlichkeit, der in jenem Vermächtnis der deutschen Bildung beschlossen 
liegt, neu zu erwerben oder ihn vielleicht für immer zu verlieren. (Baeumler 
vii–viii, emphasis in the original)
[The intellectual complex that the names of these men signify is in danger 
today.  Young people turn away from it wholesale.  They would rather seek 
their leaders in Russia than in Königsberg and Weimar.  The precious property 
of German Idealism risks becoming a more or less piously regarded piece of 
inventory from an expired (“bourgeois”) epoch. In this state of affairs, the only 
choice that remains for us is to claim possession once again of the humane 
substance that is enclosed within that legacy of German Bildung, or else per-
haps lose it forever.]
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The new cultural foil evoked here had already been named by Spengler: 
“Russentum” (Russianness).  What threat, though, did Moscow really pose to 
Königsberg and Weimar?
In a 1921 essay entitled “Goethe und Russland” (Goethe and Russia), 
the Königsberg-born music critic Eugen Zabel had reassured readers of the 
Jahrbuch der deutschen Goethe-Gesellschaft “daß der Geist Goethes immer 
weiter nach dem Osten flute, durch die blauen russischen Grenzgendarme 
nicht aufzuhalten sei und sich auch über die unendliche slawische Ebene 
auszubreiten beginne” (that the spirit of Goethe is flowing ever farther 
toward the East; it cannot be stopped by the blue-uniformed Russian border 
police and is beginning to spread across the unending Slavic plain). Even on 
the part of the Russians, Zabel went on, a recognition existed that Goethe 
represented “das beste Gegengift” to “das extreme Slawophilentum, das die 
ganze europäische Zivilisation zum Teufel jagen möchte” (the best antidote 
[to] the extreme Slavophilia that wishes to send all of European civilization 
straight to hell).41 Such wishful assurances would not hold, however, and 
once faced with an emergent Soviet Union militantly hostile to the very 
kind of German nation that he believed in, a figure such as Baeumler would 
feel an imperative to reclaim the classical intellectual culture that consti-
tuted Germany’s own distinctive strength.  To reach back into the depths of 
Germany’s intellectual arsenal necessarily meant, as we have seen, to return 
to the problem of Goethe and Kant—and indeed, Baeumler does this with 
brio. Exhuming and reanimating both icons with the urgency of one who 
believes the survival of his culture to be at stake, Baeumler is moved to pro-
duce one of the more striking iterations of this opposition that can be found. 
“Wir sind gewohnt,” he begins,
die Gebiete Kants und Goethes als antipodisch gelagerte Erdteile unseres 
intellektuellen Globus hinzunehmen. Zwischen der Moral Kants und der 
Moral Goethes gibt es in der  Tat keine Vermittlung; die Kritik der  praktischen 
Vernunft ist (unter anderem) die gewaltigste Invektive, die jemals gegen 
Goethesche Gesinnung geschrieben wurde. Dem Dichter des Wilhelm Meister 
lag nichts ferner als das Pathos der Freiheit, das Kant mit kritischer Entsagung 
in die Begriffe der Autonomie und der Pflicht gepreßt hat.
[We are accustomed to accepting Kant and Goethe as antipodally positioned 
continents of our intellectual globe.  There is indeed no mediating between the 
morality of Kant and the morality of Goethe.  The Critique of Practical Reason 
is (among other things) the mightiest invective that has ever been written 
against Goethean disposition. Nothing could be more foreign to the author of 
Wilhelm Meister than the pathos of freedom that Kant pressed—with critical 
self-negation—into the concepts of autonomy and duty.]
Not content, however, merely to reiterate an already-ingrained pattern of 
thought, Baeumler revives and amplifies a classic neo-Kantian trope that ratch-
ets the stakes even higher. In his 1880 Geschichte der neueren Philosophie 
(History of Modern Philosophy),  Wilhelm Windelband had similarly exagger-
ated Kant’s distance from contemporary German literary culture in order, 
on this basis, to make an even greater claim for his genius: allegedly cut off 
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from the arts altogether in the isolation of Königsberg, “entwirft dieser Mann 
in seiner Einsamkeit aus der philosophischen Überlegung heraus eine Lehre 
vom Ursprung der ästhetischen Auffassung und von der Produktionsweise 
des künsterlischen Genies” (this man conceives—in solitude and out of philo-
sophical reflection—a theory of the origin of the aesthetic frame of mind and 
of the mode of production of the artistic genius). Such was the force of Kant’s 
philosophical mind, argues Windelband, that he was able to articulate and 
codify the very essence of Goethe’s creative process—even though he osten-
sibly knew nothing of Goethe.  Windelband proclaims this virtually telepathic 
feat to be not only “die bewunderungswürdigste” (the most awe-inspiring) 
of Kant’s philosophical accomplishments but indeed “de[r] grösste[-] und 
einflussreichste[-] Moment unserer Kulturgeschichte: der grosse Philosoph 
denkt den grossen Künstler—Kant construirt den Begriff der Goethe’schen 
Dichtung” (the greatest and most influential moment of our intellectual his-
tory: the great philosopher thinks the great artist; Kant constructs the con-
cept of Goethean poetry). Contrary to Windelband’s assumptions, however, 
Kant was indeed informed regarding contemporary literature, and Goethe, 
in fact, was rather unimpressed with Kant’s philosophical treatment of the 
arts; this nebulous “greatest moment” in German intellectual history is little 
more than a wildly implausible fabrication.  Yet Windelband was an influen-
tial authority among philosophers, and he asserted his arguments with con-
viction:  “so ist es,” he gruffly proclaimed, “und nicht anders” (this is the way 
it is, and not any other way).42 His views thus took root, and almost half a 
century later—and in stunning form—Baeumler incorporates Windelband’s 
precarious construction of events into his own Kant book.
Von Goethe her ist Kant niemals zu verstehen.  Wohl aber ist von Kant aus 
Goethe zu verstehen. Kant hat persönlich und existentiell von Goethe nichts 
gewußt, aber er hat ihn gedacht. Dieses Gedachtwerden Goethes durch 
Kant ist vielleicht das größte und bedeutsamste Ereignis der deutschen 
Geistesgeschichte. . . . Der alte Kant, gerade der, dessen ergreifend strenges 
Antlitz uns vor Augen steht, wenn wir seinen Namen aussprechen, hat das 
gedacht, was wir historisch nicht anders als “Goethe” ausdrücken können: 
die zweckmäßig, d. h., in der Weise des Organismus auf sich beruhende, in 
eigenem Schicksal sich vollendende Einheit der Individualität. Die Kritik der 
Urteilskraft und Goethe—das ist der Gedanke und sein existentieller Ausdruck. 
In ihrer Trennung wie in ihrer Vereinigung gleich bedeutsam treten uns Kant 
und Goethe als Symbole unseres geschichtlichen Daseins entgegen. (Baeumler 
vi–vii, emphasis in the original)
[It will never be possible, coming from Goethe, to understand Kant. But it is 
certainly possible, coming from Kant, to understand Goethe. Kant knew noth-
ing, personally and existentially, of Goethe, but he thought him. Goethe’s being 
thought by Kant is perhaps the greatest and most significant event of German 
intellectual history. . . . Old Kant, the very man whose grippingly severe visage 
stands before our eyes when we speak his name, conceived that which we 
cannot express historically any other way than “Goethe”: the unity of individu-
ality that rests teleologically—that is to say, in the manner of the organism—
in itself, and that completes itself in its own fate.  The Critique of the Power 
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of Judgment and Goethe—that is the thought and its existential expression. 
Equally laden with significance in their separation and in their unity, Kant and 
Goethe stand before us as symbols of our historic existence.]
The patent absurdity—and indeed unintended comedy—of this representa-
tion are only heightened by the fact that Baeumler really is entirely earnest 
about it.  The perceived conceptual clarity of the classical past is once again 
called to the service of an uncertain and unstable present; the question of 
Goethe and Kant, once more, is not “merely” a scholarly one but a visceral, 
existential one in which Dasein itself hangs in the balance.
Reason versus Bombast
During the early 1920s, literary scholarship was regrouping and seeking to 
regain its orientation after the trauma and turbulence of the preceding dec-
ade. In 1921, following a “Kriegspause” (war recess) in its publication, the 
methodologically conservative journal Euphorion published a supplement 
dedicated to the reappraisal of Gundolf’s Goethe. Scholars now had “genü-
gend Distanz” (sufficient distance) to be able to coolly assess Gundolf’s work, 
and a consensus had now formed, asserted editor August Sauer, that rejected 
the neo-Romantic approach. “Geläutert und gefestigt, weiteren Blickes und 
tieferen Sinnes können wir uns wieder in stiller Emsigkeit der historisch 
gerichteten Erforschung unserer älteren Literatur zuwenden, zu der dieses 
Buch in schroffsten Gegensatz getreten war”43 (Cleansed and fortified, with 
a farther-reaching gaze and a deeper sensibility, we may again turn, in calm 
diligence, to the historically oriented investigation of our older literature, 
against which this book placed itself in the starkest contrast). Euphorion 
having been founded in allegiance with Scherer’s school of philology, this 
statement constitutes, in effect, a rather unimaginative call for a return to the 
literary criticism of the late nineteenth century. Between this sort of intellec-
tual timidity, at one extreme, and tendentious flights of fancy, at the other, a 
reasoned middle ground remained to be negotiated.
In the methodological opening statements of Walter Benjamin’s Wahlver-
wandtschaften (Elective Affinities) essay of 1924/25, we find one example of 
a response to the oscillations and disputes that had marked literary criticism 
since the turn of the century.  Addressing the tension between the philolo-
gists and the Geisteswissenschaftler, Benjamin opens by asserting that the 
current trend in literary scholarship places emphasis “mehr auf Rechnung 
eines philologischen als eines kritischen Interesses” (more on the account of 
a philological interest than a critical one).  The basic dichotomies by which 
Benjamin organizes his argument are familiar:  “Kommentar” (commentary), 
on the one hand, is a matter of philological concern seeking to establish the 
concrete “Sachgehalt” (substantive content) of a text; “Kritik” (critique), on 
the other hand, is a matter of conceptual concern, seeking to establish the 
text’s “Wahrheitsgehalt” (truth content). Benjamin stresses the importance of 
the philologist’s contribution, comparing him to a paleographer who makes 
an old parchment legible for modern scholars—for only once the correct 
data are in place, he emphasizes, can “critical” interpretation begin.44 At the 
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same time, Benjamin stresses the vital role of criticism: while the “commen-
tator” may be likened to a chemist who analyzes the wood and ash that a 
fire leaves behind, the “critic” is like an alchemist whose interest is in the 
flame itself—namely, the truth value that inheres in a work (Benjamin 64). 
Benjamin does not categorically prioritize one mode of scholarship over the 
other; rather, he asserts that the essential work of a scholar consists in deter-
mining how the empirical and the ideal elements of a text interact. It is a 
“Grundgesetz des Schrifttums” (fundamental law of the written word), he 
argues, that the more significant a work is, the more intimately and subtly its 
“Wahrheitsgehalt” and “Sachgehalt” are conjoined (Benjamin 63). Philosophy 
and philology, on this view, are not fundamentally at odds after all.
Benjamin speaks, then, of art and philosophy as “siblings”: while it would 
be false to construe them as identical with one another, it would be equally 
false to deny an unmistakable relationship between them.  The task of deter-
mining this relationship, Benjamin suggests, is part of the work of interpreta-
tion. “Man setze,” he writes,
daß man einen Menschen kennen lerne, der schön und anziehend ist, aber ver-
schlossen, weil er ein Geheimnis mit sich trägt. Es wäre verwerflich, in ihn drin-
gen zu wollen.  Wohl aber ist es erlaubt zu forschen, ob er Geschwister habe 
und ob deren Wesen vielleicht das Rätselhafte des Fremden in etwas erkläre. 
Ganz so forscht die Kritik nach Geschwistern des Kunstwerks. Und alle echten 
Werke haben ihre Geschwister im Bereiche der Philosophie.
[Imagine that one made the acquaintance of a person who is beautiful and 
appealing but closed off, because he carries a secret within him. It would be 
ignoble to wish to pry it out of him. It is, however, permissible to inquire as 
to whether he has siblings, and whether their essence may perhaps in some 
respect explain the mysterious aspect of this stranger. Quite in this manner, 
criticism seeks out the siblings of the work of art.  And all true works have their 
siblings in the realm of philosophy.]
To construe a literary work as standing in sheer antagonism or indifference 
toward philosophy, or else as being somehow subordinated to it, is to forgo 
an opportunity for deeper understanding—between the extremes of iden-
tity and opposition lies a more subtle and complex relation. “Nicht mit der 
Philosophie selbst konkurriert das Kunstwerk,” writes Benjamin, “es tritt 
lediglich zu ihr ins genauste Verhältnis durch seine Verwandtschaft mit dem 
Ideal des Problems” (Benjamin 108;  The work of art does not compete with 
philosophy itself; it simply places itself into a most precise relationship to it 
through its relation to the ideal of the problem).  While the work of a given 
philosopher may not directly or explicitly address the substantive content 
of a literary work, it may well, at a deeper level, demonstrate a kinship with 
regard to fundamental ideas or problems to which both respond. In the age 
of Goethe—an age distinguished by an “Armseligkeit ihrer Sachgehalte” (pov-
erty of substantive content), Benjamin states—it is in terms of problems in 
their ideal forms that works must be situated. “In diesem bestimmenden 
Zuge der deutschen—wenn nicht der gesamteuropäischen—Aufklärung 
darf eine unerläßliche Vorbedingung des Kantischen Lebenswerks einerseits, 
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des Goetheschen Schaffens andererseits erblickt werden,” writes Benjamin. 
“Denn genau um die Zeit, da Kants Werk vollendet und die Wegekarte durch 
den kahlen Wald des Wirklichen entworfen war, begann das Goethesche 
Suchen nach den Samen ewigen Wachstums” (Benjamin 64, emphasis 
added; In this determining trait of the German—if not the Europe-wide—
Enlightenment, one crucial prerequisite can be perceived for Kant’s life’s 
work, on the one hand, and for Goethe’s creative work, on the other hand. 
For precisely around the time that Kant’s work was completed, and the trail 
map through the barren forest of reality had been outlined, Goethe’s search 
for the seeds of eternal growth began).
Kant on the one hand, Goethe on the other: here we find the two fig-
ures presented not in zero-sum competition with one another but rather as 
dovetailing in a certain sense—the one picking up where the other leaves 
off, yet still clearly differentiated from each other. By giving each of the two 
figures their respective space, and acknowledging their difference without 
fashioning them into mortal enemies, Benjamin situates himself among the 
less vocal group of scholars who managed to avoid the factual confusions 
and ideological atavisms that had distorted discussion of Goethe and Kant in 
the preceding decades.
Touching on the “Auseinandersetzung” (negotiation of oppositions) 
between Goethe and Kant a few years later in his 1928 encyclopedia article 
on Goethe, Benjamin appears again to be by and large unencumbered by the 
exaggerations of previous scholars: he does not perceive it as a contradiction 
if Goethe remained “beziehungslos” (without connection) to the first two 
Critiques, while expressing “höchste Bewunderung” (highest admiration) 
for the third.  With regard to the critique of teleological judgment, Benjamin 
writes unambiguously:  “darin sind Kant und Goethe sich einig” (in this, Kant 
and Goethe are agreed). Rather than sensing a tension between Goethe’s 
interests in Spinoza and in Kant, moreover, he suggests that Goethe’s early 
interest in the former had only facilitated his later interest in the latter.45 
In these judgments, Benjamin is largely on the mark. From this sober and 
informed vantage point, the positions of earlier scholars begin to look rather 
shaky indeed—hence Benjamin’s assault on the foremost perpetrator of neo-
Romantic error, Gundolf.
Gundolf’s Goethe book, which actively takes up “[d]as gedankenloseste 
Dogma des Goethekults” (Benjamin 96; the most mindless dogma of the 
Goethe cult), had been able to generate its mythologized image of Goethe 
only by adopting what Benjamin calls a “vernichtende[-] Indifferenz gegen 
die Wahrheit” (Benjamin 98; annihilating indifference toward the truth). In 
a memorable phrase, Benjamin states that in Gundolf’s writing, the read-
er’s Verstand (reason) finds itself, as it were, “in einem Urwald, wo sich die 
Worte als plappernde Affen von Bombast zu Bombast schwingen, um nur 
den Grund nicht berühren zu müssen, der es verrät, daß sie nicht stehn kön-
nen” (Benjamin 99; in a jungle, in which the words swing like babbling mon-
keys from bombast to bombast in order not to have to touch the ground, 
which would betray that they cannot stand). Benjamin thus appeals to the 
sound reason of the reader, who might shake off the effect of Gundolf’s 
powerful style and see the hyperbole and tendentiousness of the book. 
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“Damit muß der letzte Glaube an die Überlegenheit dieses Werkes über die 
Goetheliteratur der ältern Schule schwinden, als deren rechtmäßigen und 
größeren Nachfolger die eingeschüchterte Philologie nicht allein um des 
eigenen schlechten Gewissens sondern auch um der Unmöglichkeit willen, 
an ihren Stammbegriffen es zu messen, es gelten ließ” (Benjamin 100;  With 
this, the last remaining belief in the superiority of this book over the older 
school of Goethe literature must disappear—as whose legitimate and greater 
successor it was allowed, by intimidated philologists, to be seen, not only due 
to their own bad conscience but also due to the impossibility of measuring 
it with their own conventional concepts).  While still championing the cause 
of finding philosophical “Wahrheitsgehalt” in literature, Benjamin does not 
countenance the conceptual overreach of commentators such as Gundolf—
whose judgments Benjamin believes, in any case, to have been neither true 
nor philosophical.
A monograph on Goethe that Benjamin began planning in the 1930s 
never came to be written, however, so it remains a matter of speculation 
where his contribution to the methodology of Goethe scholarship might 
have led.46 We have only adumbrations such as those above to work with, and 
his very brief and understated comments on the matter of “Goethe and Kant” 
passed by largely unnoticed; Benjamin did not succeed in putting any dent 
at all in this entrenched antithesis. By the 1930s, the voices of clearer heads 
such as Vorländer and Benjamin became scarce, and by the 1940s, the tone 
was set very much by politically reactionary patterns of thought.  As indel-
ible ideological overtones overwhelmed the actual textual and conceptual 
substance of the matter, the topic of Goethe’s stance toward Kant became 
largely untouchable in post-1945 German literary scholarship.  As a conse-
quence, investigation on this topic in the second half of the twentieth centu-
ry was undertaken disproportionately by scholars from outside Germany or 
by scholars from Germany who worked in the English-speaking world. Much 
of this research has, moreover, been conducted under the aegis of the disci-
plines of intellectual history, philosophy, or history of science; comparatively 
rarely, though, within the terrain of Germanistik proper.  A certain resistance 
to juxtaposing Goethe and Kant in any direct fashion seems to some extent 
to remain in place today, even if only out of force of habit.
Princeton University
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